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 Credit Constraints and Productivity in Peruvian Agriculture
A large theoretical literature demonstrates that information and enforcement problems in-
herent in credit transactions can lead to imperfect and even inexistent credit markets.1 A
small but growing empirical literature suggests that in rural areas of developing countries
credit constraints have signiﬁcant adverse eﬀects on farm output (Feder et. al., 1990; Sial
and Carter, 1996; Petrick, 2004), farm proﬁt (Carter, 1989; Foltz, 2004) and farm invest-
ment (Carter and Olinto, 2003). In Latin America, additional evidence on the prevalence of
credit constraints and their impacts on farm eﬃciency is particularly important as pressure
to relax or overturn the ﬁnancial liberalization policies widely implemented in the past two
decades rises. Part of this backlash against liberalization stems from frustration with land
titling programs which, by enhancing the capacity to provide collateral, were expected to
dramatically increase farm households’ access to and participation in formal credit markets.2
This paper makes two main contributions. First we empirically examine the performance
of a post-liberalization rural credit market in Peru. Speciﬁcally, we build on the endoge-
nous switching regression approach used by Sial and Carter (1996) and Carter and Olinto
(2003) to estimate the returns to productive endowments for farmers that are constrained
and unconstrained in the formal credit market. We show that while the productivity of
unconstrained households is independent of their endowments of land and liquidity, the pro-
ductivity of constrained households is tightly linked to their endowments. We then use the
model results to generate estimates of the eﬃciency loss associated with credit constraints.
1Conning and Udry (2005) provide an excellent review of the theoretical literature on credit constraints
applied to the agricultural sector in developing countries.
2In Paraguay, Carter and Olinto (2003) ﬁnd that land titles only relax supply constraints for the wealthiest
farmers. Similarly, Galeana (2004) and Field and Torrero (2006) ﬁnd that titling programs have not led to
greater participation in formal credit markets for beneﬁciary households in Mexico and Peru respectively.
1We ﬁnd this loss to be large: relaxing credit constraints would raise the value of output per
hectare in the study region by 26%.
Second, we take up the suggestion of several recent papers (Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger,
2007; Gilligan, Harrower and Quisumbing, 2005) that argue for a broader conceptual def-
inition of credit constraints. In most of the empirical literature, households are classiﬁed
as constrained only if they demonstrate an excess demand for credit. While this quantity
rationing may certainly impact farm productivity, there are two additional means by which
asymmetric information may aﬀect households’ terms of access to the credit market and
thus also their resource allocation decisions. First, banks may pass on to borrowers the
transaction costs associated with screening applicants, monitoring borrowers and enforcing
contracts. Farmers with investments that are proﬁtable when evaluated at the contractual
interest rate may decide not to borrow once transaction costs are factored in. Second, lenders
may require borrowers to bear signiﬁcant contractual risk in order to mitigate moral hazard.
If this risk is too great, a farmer will prefer not to borrow even though the loan would,
on average, raise his productivity and income. Just like a quantity rationed household,
the resource allocation and productivity of a household facing transaction cost rationing or
risk rationing will be altered relative to a ﬁrst-best world. We thus argue that quantity
rationed, transaction cost rationed and risk rationed individuals should all be considered
credit constrained.
The questionnaire used to collect our data was designed to detect all three forms of non-
price rationing. We ﬁnd that the additional forms of credit constraints are non-trivial. In
our sample, risk rationed and transaction cost rationed households account for 26% of the
overall sample and 52% of the constrained sample. They also account for 57% of output loss
associated with credit constraints.
The remainder of the paper is structured as followed. Section 1 develops a model that
generates the three types of non-price rationing underlying credit constraints. The model
2shows that each form of non-price rationing breaks the independence between resource allo-
cation and household endowments and, as a result, lowers farm productivity. We then turn
to our empirical application. Section 2 describes the economic context in Peru and the data.
Peru represents a particularly interesting context for two reasons. First, it recently carried
out a far-reaching liberalization of rural credit markets. Second, small farms, for whom
we expect information problems to be particularly severe, control the vast majority of high
quality land. In Section 3 we turn to the challenge of econometrically identifying the rela-
tionship between productivity and endowments using non-experimental data. We control
for potential problems of selection and unobserved heterogeneity by estimating a switching
regression model with panel data. Section 4 presents the model results and develops an
estimate of the impact of credit constraints on agricultural output. Section 5 concludes by
pointing to several recent policy innovation that hold promise for addressing the multiple
sources of credit market imperfections.
1 Multiple Forms of Credit Constraints and Household
Resource Allocation: A Basic Model
As noted in a long line of theoretical literature, multiple market failures can give rise to
heterogenous resource allocation across households with varying endowments of productive
assets.3 An important conclusion of this literature is that a household that is quantity
rationed in the credit market, i.e. one that has unmet demand for contracts that exist in the
market, will under-invest relative to a credit unconstrained household. As shown by Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981), equilibrium quantity rationing derives from lenders’ unwillingness to raise
the interest rate to clear excess demand because doing so would result in adverse selection
3Key expositions of non-separable household models are given by Singh et al. (1986) and De Janvry et
al. (1991).
3of the applicant pool or morally hazardous behavior by borrowers. Quantity rationing may
also result from a household’s inability to post the quantity or quality of collateral the lender
requires to overcome the information problems intrinsic to credit transactions. The adverse
consequences of quantity rationing are clear; quantity rationed individuals are involuntarily
excluded from the credit market and forego an expected income enhancing opportunity.
The actions taken by lenders to reduce information problems may also induce some house-
holds to voluntarily withdraw from the credit market even though they have investments that
are proﬁtable when considered against the interest rate, or price, of available loans. In this
paper, we focus on two additional forms of non-price rationing, namely transaction cost
rationing and risk rationing. Ex-ante screening of applicants and ex-post monitoring of
borrowers can imply signiﬁcant monetary and time costs. Meeting collateral requirements
may also imply signiﬁcant costs including veriﬁcation that the asset has a registered title
and is free of liens as well as the registration of the lien in favor of the lender. An individual
is transaction cost rationed if the non-interest monetary and time costs that arise because
of asymmetric information lead an individual to refrain from borrowing. If individuals lack
access to insurance, then collateral may have an additional repressive eﬀect on loan demand
as some individuals may not be willing to risk losing their assets. Without asymmetric
information, lenders would be willing to write highly state-contingent credit contracts that
shift risk from the borrower to the lender. This type of insurance cum credit contract is
infeasible in the presence of moral hazard, however, because the insurance inherent in the
credit contract dilutes the borrower’s incentives to reduce default risk. We follow Boucher,
Carter, and Guirkinger (2007) and label as risk rationed those individuals who have access
to an expected-income-enhancing loan but do not take it, instead retreating to a lower return
but lower risk reservation activity.
We deﬁne as credit constrained those individuals that would participate in the credit
market in a ﬁrst-best world but withdraw from the credit market as a result of asymmetric
4information. Quantity rationed individuals involuntarily withdraw; they have excess de-
mand for credit that is not met by lenders. Transaction cost and risk rationed individuals
voluntarily withdraw; they have access to loans that, considering the interest rate, would
raise their expected income; however the non-interest costs deriving from lenders’ strategies
to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard drive their expected utility from borrow-
ing below their reservation utility. A key insight from this discussion is that the interest
rate is only one component of the cost of a loan. The transaction costs and risk implied
by the loan contract represent additional costs born by the borrower and create a wedge
between the market price (interest rate) and the true cost of a loan. As in the market
participation literature (Goetz, 1992; Key, Sadoulet and de Janvry, 2000; and Bellemare
and Barrett, 2006), those households whose willingness to pay for a ﬁrst-best loan contract
falls within this “price band” will refrain from participating in the credit market and, as a
result, their resource allocation will be tightly linked to their endowments. In the remainder
of this section we develop a basic model that demonstrates that each of the three forms
of non-price rationing breaks the independence between household endowments and input
intensity, so that credit constrained households reach a lower level of farm productivity than
unconstrained households.
Consider a farm household endowed with land, A, and liquidity, K. Land quality is
homogeneous across households; however, some farmers have a title for their land while
others do not and cannot acquire one. Let T be a binary variable taking value one if the
household has a title and zero otherwise. For simplicity, also assume there is no land rental
market.4 Farm production is certain, and is carried out with a technology, F(N,A), that
exhibits constant returns to scale in land and a variable input, N, that we call fertilizer.
4This assumption about land markets is roughly consistent with the economic environment of northern
Peru, where the empirical analysis is situated. In the sample, only 4% of the total area farmed by households
is rented. Rental includes both ﬁxed rent and sharecropping.
5Given that land is a ﬁxed factor, farm proﬁt, P is:
P(n;A) = A[f(n) − pn] (1)
where n ≡ N
A, is the per-hectare level of fertilizer, p is the fertilizer price and f(n) ≡ F(N
A,1)
is the per-hectare production function. The output price is normalized to one. The function
f is strictly concave so that there exists a unique proﬁt maximizing level of fertilizer per
hectare, n∗, that is independent of the household’s land endowment.
Households may seek a bank loan to ﬁnance production. A loan contract speciﬁes three
terms: loan size, B, interest rate, and collateral. We do not explicitly endogenize the latter
two terms. Instead, we assume that, in response to asymmetric information, lenders require
that all loans be fully collateralized. Assume that the bank’s opportunity cost of funds is
zero so that, under competition, the interest rate charged on loans is also zero.5 Borrowers
potentially face two types of transaction costs. First, all borrowers incur a ﬁxed cost, t,
representing the time and monetary costs of loan application and disbursement and the costs
of collateral registration. Second, defaulters incur an additional cost, v, representing the
administrative cost of land foreclosure which is passed on to the borrower.
The household maximizes the expected utility of its end-of-period consumption which is
ﬁnanced by farm income and the value of end-of-period assets which includes any liquidity
not used in farming plus the value of land. Liquidity not used in farming earns a zero
interest rate, and the household sells any land that was not foreclosed upon at price r per
unit area.
To capture uncertainty, assume that with probability 1 − π, the household confronts a
consumption shock of size s. When hit by the shock, households who borrowed to ﬁnance
5A more complete model would fully endogenize collateral and interest rate, recognizing that these two
terms are substitutes in the lender’s return function. As demonstrated by Boucher, Carter, and Guirkinger
(2005), moral hazard limits the degree to which lenders can substitute higher interest for lower collateral
and thus truncates the menu of available contracts. The model in this paper can thus be viewed as a severe
version of this truncation in which all contracts that are not fully collateralized are ruled out.
6production must divert farm revenues intended to repay their loan to instead cover the
consumption need and, as a result, they default. The lender forecloses on the land and sells
it to recover the principal plus the foreclosure cost, v.
The consumption shock captures non-production sources of risk facing rural households
such as sickness, injury, theft, and ceremonial obligations. The primary reason for invoking
this additive form of risk is analytical simplicity. The additive shock implies that, conditional
on their credit market participation decision, households will behave as proﬁt maximizers in
their production decisions. Household risk aversion will, however, inﬂuence the decision of
whether or not to participate in the credit market.6 Non-production shocks are, in northern
Peru as in many rural areas of the developing world, an important source of uncertainty and
can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence households’ credit market participation. In the sample, 80% of
the negative shocks reported by households for the 12 months preceding the survey in 2003
were unrelated to farm production. This type of risk can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence households’
credit market participation.
With this background, the household chooses the level of input, n, and borrowing B, to
maximize expected utility according to the following program:
6Stated another way, this assumption limits the impacts of risk rationing to the credit market participation
decision and not the level of borrowing. Moving to a more realistic risk structure such as multiplicative
production risk would instead lead to risk rationing on both the extensive margin (participate versus not
participate) and the intensive margin (the amount of loan demanded). As both our theoretical and empirical









g = P(n;A) + K + rA − tI(B > 0) (3)
C
b = P(n;A) + K + rA − s − (t + v)I(B > 0) (4)
pAn ≤ K + B − tI(B > 0) (5)
0 ≤ B ≤ rAT (6)
Equations 3 and 4 give the household’s consumption under the two states of nature. Cg is the
household’s consumption under the good state of nature and is the sum of the household’s
full income minus the transaction cost of loan application if, as indicated by the indicator
function I, the household borrows. Cb is consumption under the bad state which is reduced
by the consumption shock, s, and, if the household borrowed, by the cost of foreclosure v.
Equation 5 limits expenditures on fertilizer to the value of the household’s liquidity plus
borrowing. Finally, equation 6 describes the household’s credit limit, which is equal to the
value of its titled land. We assume that the credit limit for a farmer with title is large
enough to enable him to purchase the proﬁt maximizing level of fertilizer.7
This framework enables us to explore the interplay between endowments, the various
types of credit constraints and resource allocation. Of particular interest is whether or not
a household reaches the maximum attainable farm proﬁts given its land endowment. First,
consider households with K ≥ pAn∗. Given that there is no production risk, these high
liquidity households will self-ﬁnance farm production and reach the maximum attainable
proﬁt. These households are unconstrained – or price rationed – in the credit market.
Next, consider the remainder of households with K < pAn∗. These households have
7Formally, we assume pN∗ + t
A < r, where A is the minimum farm size.
8insuﬃcient liquidity to reach the maximum attainable proﬁt without borrowing. Households
with land titles have the option of borrowing or self-ﬁnancing production. If the household
borrows, its choice of fertilizer intensity is governed by the ﬁrst order condition: f0(n) = p.
Borrowing households thus mimic the production decision of the high liquidity, self-ﬁnancing
households and reach the proﬁt maximizing level, n∗. If instead the household self-ﬁnances, it
invests its entire stock of liquidity in farm production and falls short of the proﬁt maximizing
input level, so that: f0(n) > p.
Why would a low-liquidity household that is able to borrow choose not to reach the proﬁt
maximizing input level? There are two reasons. First, for households with intermediate
liquidity to land ratios, the ﬁxed transaction costs of borrowing may drive the expected
value of consumption with a loan below the expected value under self-ﬁnance. In this case,
borrowing would be both more expensive and more risky than self-ﬁnance. Households in
this situation are transaction cost rationed.8 Second, compared to self-ﬁnance, borrowing
implies an additional risk. If borrowers experience the negative consumption shock, they
default and incur the foreclosure cost, v. Thus, even if a loan raises expected consumption
relative to self-ﬁnance, a household will forego the loan if the additional risk is too large.9
For these risk rationed households consumption is, on average, higher with a loan; however,
it is lower in the bad state when it is most valuable.
The ﬁnal group to consider includes those households that have neither title - and thus
cannot qualify for a loan - nor suﬃcient liquidity to purchase the unconstrained proﬁt max-
imizing input level. These households will be either quantity rationed, transaction cost
rationed or risk rationed. Quantity rationed farmers are those who would borrow if they
had access to a loan (i.e., if they had title). Households who would not borrow, even if they
8Transaction cost rationed households are characterized by the following equation:
t + (1 − π)v > A[P(n∗;A) − P(nSF;A)]
where nSF = K
pA is the optimal input level under self-ﬁnance.
9Suﬃcient conditions for the existence of risk rationing are available from the authors.
9had a title, are either transaction cost rationed or risk rationed.
To summarize, all three forms of non-price rationing break the independence between
a household’s endowments and its resource allocation decisions. Unconstrained farmers,
whether they self-ﬁnance or borrow, operate at the proﬁt maximizing level of inputs per
hectare. An increase in their endowment of land or liquidity would have no eﬀect on either





∂A = 0. In contrast, for credit constrained households, a change in endowments
will aﬀect output per hectare. Consider the eﬀect of an increase in liquidity for a constrained
household. As discussed above, whether this constraint derives from transaction cost, risk
or quantity rationing, the household applies less than the proﬁt maximizing level of inputs
per hectare. Since there is no risk-return tradeoﬀ in the investment of own liquidity in
farm production, any increase in a constrained household’s endowment of liquidity will be
invested in farm production. Thus, for constrained households
∂f
∂K > 0; output per hectare is
increasing in liquidity. Conversely, an increase in a constrained household’s land endowment
will lower productivity,
∂f
∂A < 0, since scarce variable inputs will be spread over a larger area.
These comparative static relationships are the focus of the ensuing empirical analysis.
2 Data and Context
The Study Area
The study is set on the northern coast of Peru in the department of Piura. Agriculture in
this area is exclusively irrigated and the well-developed system of reservoirs and irrigation
and drainage canals greatly reduces risk associated with the amount and timing of water.
Rice, cotton and corn are the main annual crops and are destined primarily for the domestic
market. Piura’s tropical climate and relatively good ports also favor the production of
perennial export crops including bananas and mangos.
10As a result of Peru’s agrarian reform (1969-1979), small farms control the majority of
agricultural land. In Piura, 91% of irrigated land is controlled by farmers that own less
than ten hectares, and the mean farm size is just under three hectares. While all land
is individually operated, not all land has a formally registered property title. In 1997,
the ﬁrst year of our panel data set, there were two main reasons that a parcel might not
have been titled. First, a signiﬁcant portion of agricultural land is controlled by peasant
communities (comunidades campesinas). Similar to Mexico’s ejidos, the community owns
the land and grants usufruct rights to individual community members. While use rights over
community land can be bequeathed, land cannot be sold without community authorization
nor can it be registered in the private property registry. As a result, community land cannot
be mortgaged. Second, a large fraction of parcels were previously part of the collectively
operated agrarian reform cooperatives. By the end of the 1980s, virtually all cooperatives
completed a privatization process that allocated land to individual cooperative members. In
many cases, this process was not accompanied by a formal survey of the individual parcels
so that owners of these parcels were unable to acquire a registered property title. By the
end of the 1990s, two policies were implemented to extend private property titles. First,
congress passed a law allowing peasant communities to privatize their land. Second a
large scale titling program was carried out both in the peasant communities that opted for
privatization as well as throughout the ex-cooperative areas.10
The limited liquidity of most small farmers plus the high input requirements of the
commercial crops grown in the region combine to make credit a critical determinant of farm
production. The rural credit market in turn, has undergone signiﬁcant changes in the last
ﬁfteen years. Until 1992, the Agrarian Development Bank (Banco Agrario) held a monopoly
over formal agricultural credit in Peru. The government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000)
implemented a ﬁnancial liberalization program that shut down the Agrarian Development
10All peasant communities in the survey area opted for privatization.
11Bank in 1992, and eliminated interest rate controls in order to induce commercial banks to
increase their presence in rural areas. The government also promoted the establishment of
rural banks (cajas rurales), and the strengthening of municipal banks (cajas municipales).
These local banks are the primary formal ﬁnancial intermediaries for small farmers in the
post-liberalization environment. Alongside this set of formal institutions, a vibrant informal
credit sector coexists. Informal loans are primarily oﬀered by local business owners, such as
grain traders, rice mills and input supply stores. Finally, there is a small set of microﬁnance
institutions run by NGO’s and local government that provide a small amount of subsidized
loans to small farmers. We refer to these institutions as the semi-formal sector.
Given this background, the speciﬁc question we seek to answer is: How do formal sector
credit constraints impact farm productivity? Whether or not and how much credit con-
straints in the formal sector matter will depend, in part, on the alternatives available in the
informal sector. In fact, because they enjoy informational advantages vis-a-vis banks, infor-
mal lenders may potentially relax each of the three types of constraints that households may
face in the formal sector. First, since informal lenders tend to oﬀer loans to households they
know through previous transactions in input or output markets for example, loan applica-
tions in the informal sector imply minimal transaction costs (Mushinski, 1999). In addition,
informal lenders rely less on collateral and more on monitoring to enforce contracts. As a
result, informal lenders may be able to oﬀer the types of low collateral, high interest rate
loans that banks are unable to supply. An active informal sector may thus relax constraints
due to quantity and risk rationing that households face in the formal sector (Boucher and
Guirkinger, 2006). Indeed, if the informal sector is a good substitute for an imperfect formal
sector, then we would expect to ﬁnd little diﬀerence in the resource allocation of households
that are constrained versus those that are unconstrained in the formal sector. However, as
we show in the econometric analysis, formal sector credit constraints indeed aﬀect resource
allocation, suggesting that the informal sector is not a perfect substitute to the formal sector.
12Sample and Data
Our econometric analysis is based on a panel data set of farm households that were surveyed
in 1997 and again in 2003. The full 1997 sample included 547 farm households. In 2003, 499
of the original households were relocated and interviewed, of which 443 were still farming.
The analysis that follows is based on the 443 households for whom we have farm production
data for both years.11 Detailed information was collected about farm output, production
costs, oﬀ-farm income, assets and the household’s participation in and perceptions of credit
markets.
The survey allows us to use a “direct elicitation” approach to classify households as con-
strained or unconstrained in the formal credit market and, if constrained, to further identify
whether the constraint derives from quantity, transaction cost or risk rationing. This ap-
proach utilizes a combination of observed outcomes and qualitative questions to detect credit
constraints.12 The ﬁrst step is to separate households that applied versus those that did not
apply for a formal loan. Applicant households are classiﬁed according to the outcome: re-
jected applicants are quantity rationed (constrained), while those whose demand was met
are price-rationed (unconstrained). Classiﬁcation of non-applicant households requires ad-
ditional information. These households were ﬁrst asked whether or not any formal lender
would oﬀer them a loan if they were to apply. If they said yes, they were then asked why
they had not applied. Those that said they had suﬃcient liquidity, the interest rate was too
high, or they had no proﬁtable investments were classiﬁed as price-rationed (unconstrained).
11Attrition may bias our estimation results if attritors are systematically diﬀerent from non-attritors after
conditioning on our explanatory variables. Given the panel structure of econometric model, we are not
aware of a formal test of attrition bias. To get a feel for whether or not attrition bias is a concern we ran
a probit of attrition against the explanatory variables plus the residuals from the productivity equations.
The coeﬃcient on the residuals is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, suggesting that once we control for
observed characteristics, attritors are not systematically diﬀerent from non-attritors in a way that aﬀects
productivity.
12Jappelli (1990) and Feder et. al. (1990) were among the ﬁrst to utilize this direct survey approach.
Boucher, Guirkinger and Trivelli (2006) provide a detailed description of the approach. Petrick (2005)
provides a critical discussion of the approach and contrasts it with alternative methodologies.
13Those that instead stated that the time, paperwork and fees of applying were too costly were
classiﬁed as transaction cost rationed (constrained); while those that cited fear of losing their
land were classiﬁed as risk rationed (constrained). Finally, households that stated that no
formal lender would oﬀer them a loan were asked whether or not they would apply for a
loan if they were guaranteed that a bank would approve their application. Those that said
yes were classiﬁed as quantity rationed (constrained). Those that said no were then asked
why not, and their answers were used to classify them as price rationed, transaction cost
rationed, or risk rationed as above.
Descriptive Statistics
In this section, we brieﬂy describe households’ participation in credit markets and the preva-
lence of credit constraints in the sample. We also provide descriptive evidence of the
diﬀerences in farm productivity between constrained and unconstrained households that will
motivate the ensuing econometric analysis.
Table 1 reports the fraction of sample households that borrowed from each sector in the
two survey years. In both years, the majority of households used some credit, although the
frequency of households with a loan drops between the two years. This drop in loan use is
mainly due to a decrease in the use of semi-formal loans. Several NGOs oﬀering loans at the
time of the ﬁrst survey were either shut down or signiﬁcantly curtailed their agricultural loan
portfolios due to widespread loan default in 1999 and 2000 resulting from the 1998 El Ni˜ no
occurrence, and the general ﬁnancial and political crisis facing Peru at the end of President
Fujimori’s term.
Table 2 compares loan terms across the three sectors. The ﬁrst two columns report
interest rates for those loans that charged a strictly positive interest rate.13 On average,
13Zero interest loans are excluded because the majority of these loans are in the form of inter-linked
contracts from local traders, processors and input suppliers. The data do not contain suﬃcient details on
the non-credit component of these linked transactions to compute the eﬀective interest rate of these loans.
Anecdotal evidence suggests, however that the cost of these transactions are similar to unlinked informal
14informal lenders charged just over 8% per month in 1997 and 10% in 2003. The average
interest rate on formal loans was just under 4% per month in both years. The lowest interest
rates are found in the semi-formal sector, reﬂecting their subsidized status.
The next four columns of table 2 compare loan size and maturity across sectors and
years. In 1997, formal loans in the sample were signiﬁcantly larger and longer term than
loans from the other two sectors. The diﬀerences across sectors decreased, however, by 2003
as the mean loan size in the formal sector fell by 45%, from $2,965 to $1,560. In 2003, the
mean maturity increased substantially in the formal and semi-formal sector. This increase
is driven by the reﬁnancing of a few formal and semi-formal loans over a 20 year period.14
In fact, median maturities across loan sectors (not reported in the table) decreased between
1997 and 2003 from 7 to 6 months for formal loans, from 6 to 5 months for informal loans and
from 8 to 6 months for semiformal loans. These maturities are consistent with households’
reporting that loans from all sectors were overwhelmingly used to ﬁnance variable costs of
agricultural production. Formal loans, in general, require borrowers to post titled property
(either agricultural land or homes) as collateral while informal and semi-formal lenders only
rarely require any form of physical collateral.
Table 3 gives the frequency of formal sector rationing outcomes for the two survey years.
The fraction of households that reported being constrained in the formal sector decreased
from 56% to 43% between the two years. This decrease was spurred by a large decrease in
the fraction of households that were quantity rationed (37% to 10%.) This is consistent with
the advances in the government’s land titling program between survey years. The fraction
of sample households with a registered title increased from 50% to 70% between 1997 and
2003 and among those who switched from quantity rationed to unconstrained, the increase
was even larger from 33% to 73%. This large decrease was partially oﬀset, however, by
loans.
14Following the 1998 El Ni˜ no, the state implemented a “ﬁnancial rescue program” (rescate ﬁnanciero)
which facilitated the reﬁnancing of certain delinquent loans.
15an increase in the incidence of risk rationing (9% to 22%.) This decrease in households’
willingness to enter into loan contracts that require them to bear signiﬁcant risk is consistent
with the high degree of political and economic instability of recent years in Peru. Many
sample households were adversely impacted by the 1998 El Ni˜ no occurrence and the regional
economic downturn that ensued.
We now turn to descriptive evidence regarding the impact of credit constraints on farm
productivity. The speciﬁc question we seek to answer is: By how much would productivity
increase if formal credit constraints were relaxed? Table 4 compares various productivity
measures across constrained and unconstrained households and thus can be used to generate
a naive, or unconditional, impact estimate. The ﬁrst column shows that the average revenues
of constrained farmers were $884 per hectare while for unconstrained farmers revenues were
just over $1,537 per hectare. The second column shows that expenditures per-hectare
on variable inputs were also signiﬁcantly less for constrained than unconstrained farmers.
The ﬁnal column shows that, subtracting expenditures from gross revenues, unconstrained
farmers’ net revenue per-hectare was about $350 more than that of constrained farmers.
According to these unconditional, estimates credit constraints have a large dampening eﬀect
on farm productivity. While this unconditional estimate suggests signiﬁcant imperfections
in the credit market, it neither tells us about the underlying relationship between productive
assets and farm productivity, nor does it account for the potential for systematic diﬀerences
in the determinants of productivity across constrained and unconstrained households. Thus
we cannot attribute this diﬀerence in mean productivity to credit constraints. In the next
section we develop an econometric model that enables us to examine the returns to productive
assets across constraint regimes and use the model to generate an estimate of the eﬃciency
loss attributable to credit constraints.
163 Econometric Model and Identiﬁcation Strategy
The ﬁrst objective of the econometric analysis is to evaluate whether or not the relationship
between farm productivity and productive endowments diﬀers across constrained and uncon-







it = βCAit + γCKit + δC0Xit + uC
it if household i is constrained in period t
yU
it = βUAit + γUKit + δU0Xit + uU
it if household i is unconstrained in period t
(7)
In the above equation yit is observed farm productivity and is equal to either constrained
productivity, yC
it, or unconstrained productivity, yU
it, depending on whether the household is
constrained or unconstrained in the credit market in period t. Ait and Kit are the household’s
endowments of land and liquidity. Xit is a vector of other observed factors that explain
productivity. uC
it and uU
it represent the eﬀect of unobserved factors that aﬀect constrained
and unconstrained productivity respectively. The parameters βC,γC,βU and γU give the
marginal impact of endowments on constrained and unconstrained productivity and are
thus our main parameters of interest. The theoretical model of the previous section predicts
that βC < 0,γC > 0 and βU = γU = 0.
A naive approach to estimate these parameters would be to run OLS separately on two
groups of observations: those that are constrained in either period and those that are un-
constrained in either period. With this approach, obtaining unbiased estimates requires:
E(uC
it|Ait,Kit,Xit;constrained) = 0 and E(uU
it|Ait,Kit,Xit;unconstrained) = 0. Two main
problems may cause these conditional expectations to be non-zero and thus lead to biased
parameter estimates: unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous selection. Unobserved het-
erogeneity leads to conventional omitted variable bias if uC and uU include determinants of
productivity that are correlated with the other regressors. Even if the unobservables are un-
17correlated with the regressors at the population level, the non-random selection process can
induce a non-zero correlation between unobservables and regressors within the constrained
and unconstrained sub-samples. For example, suppose that land quality is not measured
in the survey but is observed by lenders who take it into account in their lending decision.
Suppose also that the probability of being constrained is decreasing in farm size. This would
imply that small farmers observed in the unconstrained sub-sample tend to have high land
quality relative to large farmers in that group. In this case, the selection process would
introduce a negative correlation between farm size and land quality in the unconstrained
sub-sample and would lead to biased parameter estimates.







it = βCAit + γCKit + δC0Xit + αC
i + εC
it if dit = 1
yU
it = βUAit + γUKit + δU0Xit + αU
i + εU















Note that we have decomposed the error terms in the two productivity equations into a
time invariant household ﬁxed eﬀect, αC
i and αU
i , and a time varying eﬀect, εC
it and εU
it. We
have also explicitly modeled the selection process. The continuous variable d∗
it is the latent
propensity to be constrained for household i in period t. It is a linear function of observed
factors aﬀecting credit supply and demand, Zit, a household ﬁxed eﬀect, ηi, and unobserved
time varying factors νit. The binary variable dit takes value one if d∗
it exceeds a threshold
value set at zero and corresponds to household i being observed as constrained, either by
quantity, transaction costs or risk, in the formal credit market in period t. If the household
18is instead unconstrained, dit takes value zero.
We estimate the parameters in equation 8 in two ways. First we run OLS on the ﬁrst
diﬀerence of each productivity equation using the sub-samples of households that do not
change constraint regime across periods. As it “sweeps out” the ﬁxed eﬀects, this ﬁrst dif-
ference approach eliminates potential biases due to time invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
In addition it would eliminate selection bias if cov(ηi + νit,εit) = 0; in other words if the
unobserved factors governing selection are uncorrelated with the time varying unobservables
aﬀecting production. Recall that in our example above, selection introduced a non-zero cor-
relation between farm size and the composite error term uC
it in the constrained productivity
equation via unobserved land quality. If land quality is time invariant, this potential source
of bias would be eliminated by sweeping out the time invariant component of the error term
via ﬁrst diﬀerencing. If however the unobserved factors governing selection are correlated
with the time varying unobservables aﬀecting production, then the parameter estimates ob-
tained through a ﬁrst diﬀerence approach would be subject to bias from “residual selection”.
To illustrate this, we deﬁne ζ as the vector of all regressors and explicitly write out the
conditional expectation of the ﬁrst diﬀerence in productivity for a household constrained in





i0|di0 = 1,di1 = 1,ζ
C
i ) = β
C(Ai1 − Ai0) + γ










i , the unobserved ﬁxed factors aﬀecting productivity, have been diﬀerenced out.
Even after ﬁrst diﬀerencing however, residual selection may imply that the last term on the
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If there is a non zero correlation between εC
it and νit then each of the conditional expectations
on the right hand side will be non-zero. There are several techniques to deal with residual
selection in panel data. Wooldridge (1995) develops a parametric technique that is similar
to Heckman’s cross-sectional selection correction method. As it imposes strong distribu-
tional assumptions, in our second estimation strategy we instead follow the semi-parametric
approach of Kyriazidou (1997).15
The intuition behind Kyriazidou’s approach is as follows. Although each of the two
conditional expectation terms in equation 12 may be non zero, if the propensity that a
household is constrained does not change across the two periods, then the diﬀerence in the
conditional expectations will be zero.16 Thus estimating equation 8 using only observations
that meet this criterion would yield consistent estimates. As this trimming of the sample
would dramatically reduce the sample size, Kyriazidou proposes using all observations for
which the diﬀerence is “small enough”, and weighting them in inverse proportion to the
change in the propensity of being constrained. The estimation proceeds in two steps. First
we estimate the parameters of the selection equation with a ﬁxed eﬀect logit model. We
then use these estimates to predict the propensity to be constrained in each period. The
diﬀerences in predicted propensity are then used to generate a weight for each household,
15In particular it requires a full speciﬁcation of the underlying distribution of the individual eﬀects in
the selection equation. Wooldridge suggests a test for the presence of residual selection bias relying on the
same distributional assumptions. When we run this test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no residual
selection. As we may still face residual selection if the errors in the selection and productivity equations do
not follow the joint distribution assumed by this technique, we prefer to implement the Kyriazidou procedure.
16The main assumption underlying consistency of the estimates is the exchangeability of the error terms
which requires that conditional on all the explanatory variables (including the ﬁxed eﬀects), the error terms
are identically distributed over time.
20using a kernel density function. These weights are used in the second stage, where a weighted
OLS on the ﬁrst diﬀerence of each productivity equation is estimated.17
4 Estimation and Results
We estimate the parameters of the switching regression model of productivity speciﬁed in
equation 8 using both the Kyriazidou approach described above and simple ﬁrst diﬀerence.
Our productivity measure is the value of output per hectare.18 Under each approach ﬁrst dif-
ference regressions are run separately for the constrained and unconstrained sub-samples. As
a result, the estimations include only those households that do not change credit constraint
regime across periods.19 The same regressors are used in both techniques. As explained
above, in the Kyriazidou approach we also estimate the parameters of the selection equation
in order to generate the weights used in the estimation of the productivity equations.
Table 5 deﬁnes the regressors used in both the productivity and selection equations and
provides their means and standard deviations for constrained and unconstrained households
separately. In addition to farm size and liquidity, control variables include: the number of
adults in the household, the dependency ratio, the number of adults holding a salaried job,
the herd size, the value of durable goods, and dummy variables indicating which crops were
grown. We include the ﬁrst three variables because farm productivity of credit constrained
households may depend on the amount of available family labor.20 The stock of durable
goods is included to control for large shocks between survey years that may have aﬀected
17In the Kyriazidou estimation, we use the standard normal density function for the kernel and choose the
bandwith using the “plug-in” method suggested by Kyriazidou.
18Output quantities, output price, and expenditure data on the previous twelve months were collected
immediately after harvest. As a result, the quality of recall data for output quantity and price is greater
than for the many components of farm expenditures. We thus use the value of output instead of net revenues
per hectare as our productivity measure. Feder et. al (1990) also use the value of output per hectare to
measure productivity in their exploration of the impacts of credit constraints and productivity in China.
19Of the 443 households that farmed in both years, 252 remained either constrained or unconstrained in
both years.
20If family and hired labor are imperfect substitutes, the available family labor will also aﬀect productivity
of unconstrained households
21productivity. A health shock, for example, could imply a large expenditure and lead to
a change in the stock of durables. The herd size and crop choice variables are included
to control for diﬀerences in input requirements and expenditures across households. The
selection equation includes the following variables that aﬀect credit supply and demand:
farm size, the dependency ratio, the number of adults with a salaried job, the household’s
herd size, the value of durables, whether or not the household has a registered land title
and a network variable measuring the proportion of a household’s neighbors with a formal
loan.21,22
Before turning to the main results we brieﬂy comment on the parameter estimates of
the selection equation which are used in the Kyriazidou but not the linear panel approach.
These parameter estimates are reported in column A of table 6. As expected, possession of
a registered property title reduces the probability of being credit constrained. As it enables
households to meet the collateral requirement of lenders, possession of a title is likely to
reduce quantity rationing. Although not quite signiﬁcant, the parameter estimate on the
network variable indicates that a larger proportion of neighbors participating in the formal
credit market also reduces the probability of being credit constrained. Discussions in focus
groups with farmers from the sample revealed that new borrowers face signiﬁcant transaction
costs associated with learning about the application process. Those who have neighbors who
21A higher fraction of neighbors participating in the formal credit market is anticipated to decrease the
probability of being constrained as it is likely to reduce both the transaction cost associated with loan
application and the uncertainty resulting from an incomplete understanding of contract terms. The network
variable is constructed using a weighting matrix where the weights are inversely proportional to the distance
between households in the sample. Neighbors are deﬁned as households living within 10km of the household
considered.
22Note that some regressors from the productivity equation do not appear in the selection equation and
vice-versa. This is in contrast to the conventional Heckman selection model in which the regressors included
in the second stage are a strict subset of those in the selection equation. This exclusion restriction is required
in the Heckman procedure because the selection equation is used to generate an additional regressor in the
second stage (the inverse Mills ratio). In Kyriazidou’s approach in contrast, the selection equation is used to
construct the weights used in the estimation of the productivity equation, so that identiﬁcation does not rely
on an exclusion restriction. The reason we did not include cropping variable or liquidity in the ﬁrst stage is
because of simultaneity. Conversely title is not included in the productivity equation because a registered
title is not anticipated to have a direct tenure security eﬀect on productivity as non-titled farmers possess
alternative documents recognized by local authorities.
22can guide them through the process are less likely to be transaction cost rationed. In addition,
households who have no contact with borrowers tend to overstate the risk associated with
formal loans and are thus more likely to be risk rationed.
We now turn to the primary results of the paper. We divide the discussion into two parts.
First, we examine the relationship between endowments and productivity for constrained
versus unconstrained households. Second, we use the regression results to estimate the
reduction in productivity attributable to credit constraints.
Credit Constraints, Endowments and Productivity
Columns B and C of table 6 give parameter estimates for the unconstrained and constrained
productivity equations respectively for the kyriazidou estimation. Columns D and E do the
same for the linear panel estimation. Recall the main hypotheses relating farm productivity
and household’s endowments that were generated by the model of section 2. The model
predicts that for constrained households, the value of output per hectare is decreasing in the
household’s endowment of land and increasing in its endowment of liquidity. In contrast, farm
productivity of unconstrained households is independent of both types of endowments. The
results of both estimation techniques are consistent with these predictions. The coeﬃcients
on farm size and liquidity are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for unconstrained farmers.
Given that these farmers do not face a binding credit constraint, their production decisions
are unaﬀected by a marginal change in either liquidity or land.
In contrast for constrained farmers, the coeﬃcients on both endowments are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero and are of the predicted sign. For constrained farmers, wether the con-
straint is due to risk, transaction cost or quantity rationing, the shadow value of liquidity
is positive. These constrained households would use additional liquidity to invest in farm
production. According to the Kyriazidou estimates, a thousand dollar increase in liquidity
would raise the value of production per hectare by $260. The corresponding increase using
23the linear panel estimates is slightly smaller, $183 per hectare. Given that the mean value of
output per hectare reported in table 4 was just under $900 for constrained households, this
represents a 20 to 30% increase in productivity. The results of the Kyriazidou and linear
panel estimates indicate that a one hectare increase in farm size would decrease the value
of output per hectare for constrained farmers by $164 and $131 respectively. Given their
constrained access to liquidity, increasing the area cultivated would reduce the intensity of
input use per unit of land thereby lowering productivity.
To examine the robustness of the results, we repeat the linear panel estimations under
two alternative speciﬁcations. In the per-hectare speciﬁcation, the dependent variable is
again the value of output per hectare, while the household endowment of liquidity and labor
are expressed per-unit of land. In the log-linear speciﬁcation, productivity and households’
endowment of land, liquidity and labor are expressed in log form. The parameter estimates
are reported in the ﬁnal four columns of table 6. In general, the results discussed above hold
in both alternative speciﬁcations. Constrained productivity is a decreasing function of the
land endowment, while unconstrained productivity is independent of the household’s land
endowment. The only departure from the theoretical predictions comes when the log-linear
speciﬁcation is estimated via linear panel. Liquidity has a positive and signiﬁcant impact
on both constrained and unconstrained productivity. We take some comfort in the fact that
the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on liquidity is smaller for unconstrained productivity.
Eﬃciency Loss due to Credit Constraints
The results discussed above suggest that household resource allocation is impacted by credit
constraints. We now turn to quantifying the magnitude of this impact on farm productivity.
The speciﬁc question we ask is: By how much would the productivity of farmers constrained
in the formal sector increase if their credit constraint were removed? We are thus interested
in constructing an estimate of ∆it ≡ yU
it − yC
it for households that are credit constrained.
24The conditional expectation of interest is thus:



















it|dit = 1) (13)
The last two terms of equation 13 complicate the estimation of this impact.23 The ﬁnal
term will be non-zero if there is residual selection. Since the semi-parametric technique
of Kyriazidou does not impose a functional form on the joint distribution of εit and νit, we
cannot estimate this conditional mean. We therefore rely on the results from the linear panel
estimation. Estimating the household ﬁxed eﬀects is also problematic. At most, we have
two observations to identify αU
i and αC
i .24 As a result we cannot generate reliable estimates
of the ﬁxed eﬀects. In order to estimate the impact, we assume that the household ﬁxed
eﬀects have the same impact on constrained and unconstrained productivity: ∀i,αU
i = αC
i .
The predicted impact for each constrained household is thus computed as:
ˆ ∆it = (ˆ β
U − ˆ β
C)Ait + (ˆ γ
U − ˆ γ
C)Kit + (ˆ δ
U − ˆ δ
C)
0Xit + (ˆ θ
U − ˆ θ
C)
0Zit (14)
where ˆ βU, ˆ βC, ˆ γU, ˆ γC, ˆ δU, ˆ δC, ˆ θU, ˆ θC are the parameter estimates reported in the ﬁrst two
columns of table 6.
Table 7 summarizes the predicted impact of alleviating the three types of credit con-
straints.25 Column A gives the frequency over the two years of each type of constraint in
the sample. The last row of this column shows that, on average, 49.5% of households were
constrained each year. Column B reports the mean change in productivity, ¯ ˆ ∆, for each
type of constraint. The productivity loss due to credit constraints is large. We estimate
23For brevity, the other conditioning variables are suppressed.
24Households that do not switch credit constraint status provide two observations to estimate one of the
ﬁxed eﬀects and zero to estimate the other ﬁxed eﬀect, while switchers provide one observation for each ﬁxed
eﬀect.
25We use the parameter estimates from the linear speciﬁcation.
25that, on average, the value of output would increase by $482 per hectare if all types of credit
constraints were fully relaxed. As shown in column C, this represents an increase of 59%
over the average observed productivity of constrained households. The ﬁnal two columns
are used to generate a rough estimate of the value of output foregone in the region due to
credit constraints.26 Column D reports an estimate of the percentage of land in Piura in
the hands of constrained households. Note that constrained households are estimated to
control 44.3% of the region’s land, although they account for 49.5% of sample households.
This reﬂects the fact that the average farm size of constrained households, at 4.5 hectares,
is slightly below the mean of 4.9 hectares for unconstrained households. Finally, column E,
the product of columns C and D, reports the estimated percentage increase in the value
of regional output resulting from relaxing each type of credit constraint. If all constraints
were alleviated, the value of output would increase by 26%. The vast majority of the impact
derives from quantity and risk rationing. While the frequency of risk rationing is less than
that of quantity rationing, the increase in regional output due to risk rationing, 10.9%, is
almost the same as the increase due to quantity rationing, 11.9%. This is due to the larger
relative impact of risk rationing on productivity. These results demonstrate the importance
of the broader deﬁnition of credit constraints. Ignoring constraints due to transaction cost
and particularly risk rationing would result in a signiﬁcant under-statement of the impact
of credit constraints and thus lead to an overly optimistic evaluation of the health of rural
ﬁnancial markets.27
26We ignore any general equilibrium impacts such as changes in factor and product prices that would
result from removing credit constraints.
27Misclassifying risk and transaction cost rationed households as unconstrained may also lead to bias in
the parameter estimates of the productivity equations.
265 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a basic model to show that credit constraints can take multiple
forms, each of which breaks the independence between household’s resource allocation and
endowments. We then empirically compared the relationship between productivity and
endowments across credit constrained and unconstrained households in Peru. While most
empirical studies consider only quantity rationed households as constrained, we also consider
as constrained households that are risk and transaction cost rationed. Theory indicates that
the resource allocation of these households, just like that of quantity rationed households is
adversely aﬀected by the information and enforcement problems underlying credit transac-
tions. We ﬁnd that the productivity of constrained households, unlike that of unconstrained
ones, indeed depends upon their endowments of productive assets. We show that credit
constraints have a large negative impact on the eﬃciency of resource allocation in the study
region. We estimate that the value of agricultural production in Piura would increase by
26% if all credit constraints were eliminated.
The broader deﬁnition of credit constraints used here suggests that mitigating rural
credit market imperfections requires a broader policy response than contemplated in recent
ﬁnancial liberalization eﬀorts. The ﬁrst stage of most ﬁnancial liberalization programs in
Latin America was accompanied by liberalization of agricultural land markets in the form
of land titling programs, investment in land registry institutions and the elimination of legal
restrictions on land transfer. The deepening of these reforms, by facilitating the use of land
as collateral, may reduce the incidence of quantity rationing. Indeed in our sample 80% of
households that borrowed in the formal sector had a registered property title compared to
59% of the overall sample and only 37% of quantity rationed households. This suggests that
consolidation of the ﬁrst stage property rights reform would yield additional gains in the
eﬃciency of rural ﬁnancial markets. As a portion of the transaction costs associated with
27loan application derives from collateral registration, these reforms, along with reforms aimed
at enhancing the eﬃciency of the legal system and strengthening information sharing via
credit bureaus, may also reduce transaction cost rationing. De Janvry et. al. (2006) ﬁnd that
in Guatemala the implementation of a credit bureau led to enhanced repayment performance
of a large microlender by reducing problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.
The aforementioned property rights reforms are likely to do little, however, to alleviate
risk rationing. Indeed 73% of the risk rationed households in our sample possess a title,
suggesting that access per se is not a binding constraint. Instead it is the terms of access,
in particular the risk implied by available credit contracts, that suppress these households’
credit demand and lead them to pursue alternative lower return strategies. The prevalence of
risk rationing suggests that enhancing the performance of rural credit markets also requires
addressing the insurance market failures endemic to rural areas of developing countries. One
particularly interesting area of research and policy innovation in this direction is index-
based insurance which can be implemented at relatively low cost and is less susceptible
to the moral hazard and adverse selection plaguing conventional crop insurance programs.
With the support of the World Bank several such initiatives have been launched in various
developing countries.28 Although initial evidence is promising, additional research is required
to evaluate the full impact of these programs and their potential positive synergies with rural
credit markets.
28World Bank (2005) provides an overview of index insurance and its application to risk management
in developing countries. Rainfall insurance products in Morocco, India and Malawi are described by Skees
(2001), Hess (2003) and Gine and Yang (2007). Skees (2002) describes an index insurance product based on
regional livestock mortality levels for herders in Mongolia.
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32Table 1: Credit Market Participation by Sector
% of sample using: 1997 2003
Formal loan 27.5% 25.0%
Informal loan 35.5% 33.5%
Semi formal loan 16.0% 7.0%
No loan 28.0% 42.0%
33Table 2: A Comparison of Mean Loan Terms across Sectors (standard deviation in paren-
theses)
Interest rate Size Maturity % Requiring
(monthly) ($US 2003) (months) Collateral
Sector 1997 2003 1997 2003 1997 2003 1997 2003
Formal 3.8 (1.3) 4.2 (1.5) 2965 (6481) 1560 (1994) 9.3 (9.2) 11.9 (27.0) 58 60
Informal 8.5 (3.6) 10.1 (4.0) 492 (508) 360 (810) 5.6 (1.9) 5.3 (3.6) 0 9
Semiformal 1.7 (0.8) 3.4 (1.2) 1132 (999) 677 (850) 7.1 (1.69) 35.9 (43.9) 0 14
NOTE: All loan terms in the informal and semi-formal sectors are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (at 5%)
from the same term in the formal sector.
34Table 3: Rationing Mechanisms in the Formal Sector
1997 2003
Constrained 56% 43%
Quantity Rationed 37% 10%
Risk Rationed 9% 22%




35Table 4: Productivity Indicators: Pooled Sample Means and Standard Deviations (in paren-
theses)
Revenue Cost Net revenue
per ha per ha per ha
Constrained $884 (921) $350 (299) $534 (753)
Unconstrained $1537 (1110) $652 (498) $885 (818)
36Table 5: Means and Standard Deviations of Explanatory Variables by Constraint Status*
Unconst. Const.
(N=437) (N=447)
Variable Deﬁnition Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
A Farm size (ha) 4.943 6.492 4.001 4.152
K Liquidity: credit+saving (103 $) 2.193 4.809 0.558 1.108
Labor # adults (¿15 years) 4.257 2.043 4.050 1.872
Dep Ratio Children/household size 0.178 0.194 0.200 0.207
Reg Inc # adults w/ salaried job 0.150 0.415 0.103 0.333
Herd Head of cattle 1.525 4.417 1.644 4.032
Rice 1 if cultivates rice 0.587 0.493 0.466 0.499
Cotton 1 if cultivates cotton 0.147 0.355 0.276 0.448
Banana 1 if cultivates banana 0.205 0.404 0.217 0.413
Corn 1 if cultivates corn 0.257 0.437 0.441 0.497
Durables Value of durable goods (103 $) 6.325 23.169 2.947 3.791
Title 1 if has a title 0.710 0.454 0.482 0.500
network proportion of neighbors w/ formal loan 0.362 0.274 0.204 0.221
* pooled full sample
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